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The Retreat from Westphalia: Iraq and the “Shadow of Power”¹

James Nathan

Khalid bin Sultan Eminent Scholar, Goodwin Hall 209K, Auburn University, Montgomery,
PO Box 244023 Alabama 35124, USA

Today, if we went into Iraq, like the president would like us to do, you know where you begin. You never know where you are going to end.

George Kennan²

No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.

Karl von Clausewitz³

A “REPUTATION FOR FEROCITY”⁴

Force ought to be effectively related to diplomacy in any foreign policy that aims for world order. Yet the Bush administration has proved no more capable of linking force to diplomacy than the New Strategists of the 1950s and 1960s – whose kindred visions were undone in Vietnam. The irony of the misbegotten Iraq and Asian undertaking is that they have recapitulated each other. The result has been the opposite of the intended effort: the depreciation of both diplomacy and American power. The tragedy of Vietnam and Iraq are the astonishing numbers who suffer and the body blow to the reputation of American competence in world politics. For without an assurance that arms can be redeemed by success, an ambitious foreign policy is not possible.

Power depends on empirical validation. Without credible force, power depreciates. Like a coin of poor reputation, power without the demonstrated ability to coerce, devalues. It is this logic that seems to have propelled the Bush administration to war in Iraq. Henry Kissinger almost seemed weirdly gleeful at the prospect of the humbling of Saddam’s Iraq, “Because Afghanistan wasn’t enough . . . in the conflict with radical Islam. They want to humiliate us. And we need to humiliate them.”⁵ Kissinger’s reasoning for support of George W. Bush’s Iraq war was widely echoed among

American conservatives. As one official chronicle of the Bush White House summarized Vice President Cheney's reasoning: "The primary impetus for invading Iraq . . . was to make an example of Hussein, to create a demonstration model to guide the behavior of anyone with the temerity to acquire destructive weapons or, in any way, flout the authority of the United States."⁶

The twin American enterprises of Afghanistan and Iraq were hoped to buttress America's ability to manage world order. As an apparently satisfied Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld enthused: "The world has seen . . . the United States and the coalition forces go into Iraq . . . That has to have a deterrent effect on people. If you put yourself in the shoes of a country that might decide they'd like to make mischief, they have a very recent, vivid example of the fact that the United States has the ability to deal with this."⁷

POWER ON THE SLY: DEFENSE MANAGEMENT THEN AND NOW

Among strategists, there is a classic worry that the use of force for less than supreme and over-riding interests will be ultimately ineffective due to the lack of both will and means brought to bear on the issue. This is what Clausewitz, the great avatar of military thought, observed at the start of Europe's "Concert" system of diplomacy: "the weaker the motives . . . the less . . . force is coincident . . . so . . . War becomes diverted from the . . . ideal absolute War, and the War appears to become political . . . If the plan is directed only upon a small object, then the impulses of feeling amongst the masses will be also so weak that these masses will require to be stimulated rather than repressed."⁸ Similarly, in the salad days of the Cold War, there was widespread hope among defense planners that limited war could be resuscitated.⁹

Many who studied the issue, such as Robert E. Osgood, fretted that democratic electorates would not see the logic of arms in areas only incidental to critical interests. "Perhaps", Osgood, conjectured, "the people must be artfully cajoled into undertaking new courses of action by indirection . . . by disguising new imperatives."¹⁰ Thus, small wars in the last half-century or so have been framed, not with full debate, but as a kind of over-sold *fait accompli*, presented to the American people largely without prior debate, and with markedly insufficient information for what debate there has been. A carefully modulated drumbeat of war became a prescriptive template – indeed, an article of faith – among national security managers from the 1960s to the present. In the Johnson years, initially it was to the great self-satisfaction of the administration's national security team that they had avoided the greatest peril of all, unconstrained war. As Daniel Ellsberg recalled, Defense Secretary Robert "McNamara was 'tireless and shrewd . . . in this'." The Defense Secretary was determined ". . . to demonstrate that success was possible in Indochina without the need either to compromise Cold War objectives or to threaten or use nuclear weapons."¹¹

The parallels between Vietnam and Iraq are striking. The resources and geography of Indochina were not as critical as the Mid-East, but both represented an important signal of American willingness to honor its commitments and vindicate itself in unconventional war. The war in Iraq was seen by its proponents as important not so much because Saddam's Iraq posed a meaningful near-term threat, but because his dispos-

session offered great payoff in the “war against terror” – a recompense measured in easing American energy needs; in ensuring Israel’s survival; and in prompting democratic change within the Muslim world; and, in adding to America’s reputation for the measured and effective use of force.

Like the Kennedy administration, Donald Rumsfeld and his acolyte “Vulcans”¹² were not prepared to be grabbed at the forelock by military machines or be imprisoned by military professionals. Just as the MacNamara civilians viewed the professional military as troglodytes, wed to stale and dangerous doctrines, so too, the Rumsfeld-era civilians felt that the military they inherited in 2001 was a relic of another day: too slow, too big, too conservative, too behind the technological curve, and too accepting of the dogmas of another generation. General Hugh Shelton, for instance, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before September 2001, recalled his “shock” at Rumsfeld’s approach to the military. Shelton, an affable Special Forces “operator” with two combat tours in Vietnam, felt a “second-rate citizen” who was seen as not just a bit slow. It “was so bad”, recalled Shelton, “that we would say, ‘It’s sunny outside’, and they would respond, ‘Oh, yeah? Raise the blinds and prove it’.”¹³ In both eras, the civilian leadership of the Pentagon began to rely more and more on military instrumentalities with a senior military staff they deemed dull-witted and antiquated. Yet in both eras, few civilian defense managers were trained in military arts or had ever held commissioned command in the very structure they considered second-rate.

In neither the Rumsfeld Pentagon nor during the Kennedy era did managers of national security policy feel they could fully disclose their policy’s direction or full agenda, at least at first. President Johnson mis-stated and veiled the initial build-up for forces on his watch. On 12 August 1964, during a campaign stop in New York, Lyndon Johnson promised to the American Bar Association that if he were elected, he would not “supply American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do”. Meanwhile, Johnson’s advisers had incubated a plan to gradually bring American force levels to half a million men. In the case of G. W. Bush, even his Secretary of State believed the President was open to diplomacy until the winter of 2002–2003. Congress, meanwhile, had debated the authorization to war that fell on the premise that it was strengthening the President’s diplomatic hand. As the machine of war rumbled forward, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s deployment of resources in the Gulf was managed by a methodology he called “hiding in plain sight”.

In both wars, national leadership seemed bumptious and bellicose to the point that America’s well-wishers recoiled in embarrassment. The two Texan Presidents echo each other. Bush said of insurgents, “Bring ’em on”; and Lyndon Johnson bellowed his imprecation to “nail the coonskin on the wall”.¹⁴ And Johnson had said, “If you let a bully come in and chase you out of your front yard, tomorrow he’ll be on your porch, and the next day he’ll rape your wife in your own bed.”¹⁵ Bush told the United Nations on 20 September 2004: “Coalition forces now serving in Iraq are confronting the terrorists and foreign fighters, so peaceful nations around the world will never have to face them within our own borders.”¹⁶

Both wars were launched on the artfully contrived predicate of dubious intelligence. The events leading up to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution were largely fictive. There was no second attack on US warships. The Navy had not been innocently operating on the

high seas.¹⁷ And, of course, in Iraq, there were no weapons of mass destruction.¹⁸ In both wars, Congress's eagerness to accommodate the Executive was a striking (and dispiriting) parallel. Eighty-seven-year-old Senator Robert C. Byrd [D-W.Va.], was one of the few legislators who seemed scalded by the memory of executive deceits a generation before: "I was one of the Senators who voted for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Yes, I voted for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. I am sorry for that . . . But I am not wanting to commit that sin twice, and that is exactly what we are doing here. This is another Gulf of Tonkin resolution."¹⁹

There was more. As in Vietnam, the American presence is not welcome. Like Vietnam, the issue of security for Iraqis themselves is critical. Then and now, success would depend on legitimacy of the government American-led coalitions fought for. Though both client governments gained external recognition, neither the government of South Vietnam nor any post-Saddam government of Iraq commanded much internal support. Neither could function to secure territory, collect taxes, or provide services. The government of South Vietnam was led by a dismal parade of undistinguished Generals, while the government of Iraq took on an increasingly Frankensteinian cast: part Shia, part American, part militia, part Kurdish, and the rest, up for grabs.

For a time, in Iraq, the American presence faced an insurgent force qualitatively poorer than in Vietnam.²⁰ A local constabulary army of Iraqis might have been an able substitute for the United States if it were paid, organized, trained, motivated, and supported by a wide coalition of European and regional stabilization forces. For a while, the prospects for stability seemed much less fanciful. But that time soon passed; and it may well have been illusory from the onset.²¹

WARS OF CHOICE AND CHANCE: WHEN DOES LUCK RUN OUT?

To render an analogy of one war with another can be seductive. Clausewitz had it right: "There is no human affair which stands so constantly and so generally in close connection with chance as war."²² And though four decades separate the war in Vietnam and America's second war with Iraq, many observers could not escape the impression that American policy in Vietnam was being reprised.

Yet again, confident security managers treated Congress and the public as if they were benighted novitiates regarding the demands of America's larger purposes. Once again, truth in high places when it came to matters of the national accounts, measured in terms of blood and treasure, was held at a discount. The bothersome restrictions of international law were again depreciated. As Dean Acheson put it, when "the power, prestige and position of the United States had been challenged . . . Law simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate power . . . it . . . is not a matter of law."²³ Or, as John Yoo,²⁴ a legal adviser to the White House in the Bush years put it, "the president has the sole authority to interpret the Geneva Conventions on behalf of the United States . . ." This astonishing bit of legal flummery was made into law in 2006.²⁵ Astoundingly, judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter [R-Pa.] told reporters that the bill was "patently unconstitutional on its face" just hours before he walked on the floor and voted for it.²⁶

But the most compelling and disturbing and pervasive parallel lay not just in the

misjudged prospects of success, but in the ever-present imperative – for American policymakers for the last 70 years – to demonstrate the relevance of American power to events. It was this reflex that prompted Henry Kissinger to suggest, in April 1975 as Saigon collapsed, that American planners muster the grit to find a way to redeem American power: “The US must carry out some act somewhere in the world . . .”. As Kissinger put it, “the next time the US would have to act more strongly in order to repair the damage and make others believe us again”.²⁷

Even when the human heart is open and an inspection is informed by intimacy, motives are rarely unclouded. But there are indicators that part of the administration’s eagerness to use force can be found in the urge to underscore and confirm the relevance of America’s military power after 11 September 2001. What else could explain the behavior of senior Bush administration advisers in the first hours after 11 September 2001? As Richard Clarke recalled, “On the morning of the 12th, 2001 . . . CIA was explicit now that al Qaeda was guilty of the attacks, but Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz [said] . . . there were no decent targets for bombing in Afghanistan and that we should consider bombing Iraq, which, [Rumsfeld] said, had better targets . . .”.²⁸ The notion of attacking Iraq, exploded Clarke, was factually and logically silly: “Having been attacked by al Qaeda, for us now to go bombing Iraq in response would be like our invading Mexico after the Japanese attacked us at Pearl Harbor.”²⁹

The President knew, or should have known, that Iraq was not linked to the events of 11 September.³⁰ But the need for victory was not simply bizarre logic tied to poor evidence. It was an imperative of its own that found American policymakers looking for a success that would vanquish once and for all the idea – expressed by both Saddam in July 1990 and by Osama bin Laden in 1998 – that America did not have the guts or competence necessary to prevail. Saddam’s domination to Ambassador Glaspie rankled still. “I hold this view,” Saddam told the US Ambassador in Damascus, “yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle.”³¹

For a decade after the elder Bush’s electoral defeat, a *coterie* of defense intellectuals, self-styled “Vulcans”, had been calling for a reversal of the “containment” of Saddam’s Iraq. The ambiguous end of the first Gulf War, as much as America’s earlier defeat in Vietnam, fueled their distaste for any future limitations on the scope and exercise of American power. Military power is a positive force, the Vulcans argued. It can and should be used for good purposes; and arguments about American over-extension, sensitivities of allies, American discomfiture at taking armed initiatives without immediate provocation – to the “Vulcans” – were trumped by the need to refurbish America’s reputation at arms. Privately, some “Vulcans” were quite frank about the intended train of consequences involved in the use of American force. At the same time, voices of “neo-conservative” belligerents began to bang the drums of war in public. In February 2003, then Undersecretary of State John Bolton told Israeli officials that after defeating Iraq, the United States would “deal” with Iran, Syria and North Korea.

For America’s more assertive twenty-first-century defense planners, the management of paramountcy required empirical confirmation of power. Given that the American stomach for combat has been widely impeached abroad and given that, in fact, in the military’s own doctrinal literature, the so-called Powell–Weinberger Doctrine had called into question mere demonstrations of less than all-out uses of

force, demonstrations of American armed competence were deemed essential by Bush planners after 11 September 2001. Norman Podhoretz of *Commentary* and Jeffrey Bell of the *Weekly Standard* argued that the administration had geared up for a “world war between the United States and a political wing of Islamic fundamentalism . . . a war of such reach and magnitude [that] the invasion of Iraq, or the capture of top al Qaeda commanders, should be seen as tactical events in a series of moves and countermoves stretching well into the future”.

Those widespread notions that Americans did not have the belly for bloody war prompted long-time defense *cognoscenti* such as Richard Perle (then Chairman of the Defense Policy Board), to bludgeon ceaselessly those who opposed American interests, whether terrorists or not. As Perle argued, even as the Afghan campaign had not yet unfolded, the US ought to proceed to use force against Iraq and others. The target country, argued Perle, was less important than the recovery of America’s coercive potential:

Whether it is [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein or [Syrian President Bashar] Assad or the Lebanese or the Sudanese . . . the regimes involved have to be persuaded that we will use whatever tool is necessary and that they are truly in jeopardy. The best way to give that the necessary reality is to do it in a couple of cases.³²

There is considerable evidence that Iraq could have been disarmed, and even opened to internationally supervised elections, had the US chosen patient coercion instead of war. “Old Europe”³³ had offered much more diplomatic cover and support than the administration was prepared to indicate publicly. France was hardly as unhelpful as the Bush administration indicated. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin told Secretary of State Colin Powell that France would join Britain and the United States in armed action if Iraq did not fully co-operate with UN inspectors.³⁴ In October 2002, with the passage of Security Council Resolution 1441, French officials claimed they had readied some 15,000 troops specifically to assist the coming American invasion of Iraq. The offer was withdrawn, it was reported, when President Chirac determined that President Bush was bent on a war no matter what concessions the Iraqis made.

Had the US allowed a month or so for the *kabuki* of inspections and compliance to play out, then both France and Russia would have enabled the American action. As France’s Ambassador to the US, Jean-David Levitte, told Colin Powell, UN Security Council could be bypassed since, “[y]our interpretation (of 1441) is sufficient [to justify war] . . . [and] . . . you should rely on your interpretation”.³⁵ It is unclear if the French were simply disbelieved in Washington or, more likely, deemed all but irrelevant by the Pentagon and White House. The decision to go to war had its own dynamic; the deployments had been designed as a deadman’s switch. American forces held in the ever-warming March 2003 sands of Kuwait were a wasting asset. Rumsfeld informed the President that, once forces were under way, they could stay but two or three months in the field without finding their effectiveness and morale seriously degraded.

A last-minute overture from Saddam might have been explored if there had not been an unseemly eagerness to vindicate American arms, dispel Vietnam, and redeem the evident mistake of 1991 in reprivating Saddam’s elite forces so that they could smash the

very revolts the first President Bush had called for. But for the Bush era “Vulcans” no diplomatic solution could cleanse the shame of the unfinished business of 1991. Iraqi officials (including the chief of Iraq’s intelligence service), in February 2003, sent a secret message that Saddam Hussein wanted to make a deal. The interlocutor selected by Iraqi intelligence was the well-placed Reagan-era functionary, Richard Perle. The message, said to be from Saddam himself, contained the following points:

1. Iraq no longer had weapons of mass destruction.
2. American troops massed on the border could be allowed in Iraq with experts to verify Iraqi compliance. “Americans could send 2,000 FBI agents to look wherever they wanted” . . . “If this is about weapons of mass destruction, let the Americans send over their people. There are no weapons of mass destruction.”
3. Iraqis would also hand over a suspect in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing who had a 25-million-dollar price on his head.
4. Iraq would hold elections.
5. America could have economic access to Iraq, “if this is about oil, we will talk about US oil concessions . . .”.
6. Saddam would be willing to assist in the Palestinian issue. In fact, the overture specified “full support for any US plan in the Arab–Israeli peace process”. “If it is about the peace process, then we can talk”, said the Iraqi message.
7. The terms on which Saddam would negotiate and the issues to be discussed were “unconditional”. One of the messages read “We’re prepared to meet with you in Beirut, and as soon as possible, concerning ‘unconditional terms’ . . . Such a meeting has Saddam Hussein’s clearance.”³⁶

Richard Perle recalled later that he asked the CIA and the Defense Department if he should pursue these conversations. Iraq’s intelligence chief, he reported, was “begging” for a dialogue. Perle told the *New York Times* that the message from Washington to the Iraqis was as brutal as it was blunt: “Tell them that we will see them in Baghdad.”³⁷ The urge to resuscitate American instruments of power by the use of determined force was old; but the urgency with which the Bush administration sought out Iraq was new. President Bush and his dominant policymakers seem to have rejected diplomacy, perhaps as early as March 2002; even though there was more than a passing chance that diplomacy would have “worked”. Instead, the President, and certainly his most valued advisers (with the exception of Secretary of State Powell), like Frederick the Great determined that success ought to be purchased by “big guns” – and largely alone.

THE RESTORATION OF US REPUTATION AT ARMS, AND OTHER MOTIVES

An exact parsing of motives in any decision is always illusive. But it is undeniable that a greater part of the reasoning that lay behind the extirpation of Saddam took the shape of a kind of rejigged and beneficent domino theory. It was widely postulated that success in Iraq would lead to success elsewhere. Perhaps it was only an example of *post hoc ergo propter hoc* rationalization, but the old Wilsonian impulse continued in the Bush

years after 11 September. Dr Condoleezza Rice, the Bush administration's National Security Adviser, struggled to describe to the world what the Bush administration strove to make anew after the 11 September attacks:

we fight to make the world safer . . . We and our allies must make a generational commitment to helping the people of the Middle East transform their region . . . In many ways, the opportunity before us today is similar to that we faced in the wake of World War II . . . We promoted democratic values at every opportunity . . . We made a generational commitment to . . . the transformation of Europe. The transformation of the Middle East . . . is the security challenge – and moral mission – of our time.³⁸

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, similarly sunnily predicted that Iraq, as the “first Arab democracy”, would “cast a large regime-changing shadow” across the whole Arab world.³⁹ Deputy Secretary John Bolton was equally sanguine about Iraq's payoff: “We are hopeful that a number of regimes will draw the appropriate lesson from Iraq that the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is not in their national interest.”⁴⁰ Similarly, Richard Perle suggested that Iraq “has the potential to transform the thinking of people around the world about the potential for democracy, even in Arab countries where people have been disparaging of their potential”.⁴¹ And Yale's John Lewis Gaddis, the eminent American historian, believed, as he told *Frontline* on 16 January 2003, the greater prize in the struggle for the Gulf seemed America's old friends in the region and the undoing of America's history of tolerating their support of extremists: “this is a strategy that's ultimately targeted at the Saudis and at the Egyptians and at the Pakistanis; these authoritarian regimes that, in fact, have been the biggest breeders of terrorism in recent years. Iraq has not been; Saudi Arabia actually was. And I think the administration is thinking over the long term about that problem, too.”⁴²

The hope for democratic Iraq to transform the structure of order in the Middle East may appear, in retrospect, to some to be a kind of policy “rebranding” after the failure to find weapons of mass destruction. But whatever the explanation of the Bush administration's strange *idée fixe* regarding Saddam Hussein, official reasoning about Iraq morphed and twisted. It was clear the Bush administration during the run-up to war had accepted the classic Wilsonian repertoire of American foreign policy to be extended to all corners of the globe. The summary statement of the National Security Strategy released in September 2002 declared, “We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.”⁴³

As US forces massed in Kuwait, Mr Bush, on 26 February 2003, declaimed that the American cause was part of the

great tests . . . of our time. The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder . . . A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region . . . Success in Iraq could . . . begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace . . . And other regimes will be given a clear warning that support for terror will not be tolerated . . .⁴⁴

The call for regional democracy was repeated in 2003 and 2004. And in Bush's soaring second term inaugural, on 20 January 2005, the President declared:

For as long as whole regions of the world simmer in resentment and tyranny – prone to ideologies that feed hatred and excuse murder, violence will gather and multiply in destructive power, and cross the most defended borders, and raise a mortal threat. There is only one force of history that can break the reign of hatred and resentment, and expose the pretensions of tyrants, and reward the hopes of the decent and tolerant, and that is the force of human freedom.⁴⁵

To the amazement of many, events initially seem to comport with, and apparently confirm, the President's vision. In the weeks before and after the President's second election, the long wave of democracy finally started to wet the shores of the Middle East.⁴⁶ First, there was the picture of millions of Iraqis braving a rain of terrorist outrages in order to vote. Weeks later, Abu Mazan, a man utterly dedicated to peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, was elected by a huge majority in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza. Within days, President Mubarak, apparently responding to the Bush administration's pressure, told his largely hand-picked parliament, that "[f]or the first time since the days of the pharaohs, the Egyptian people will choose their ruler".⁴⁷ Two days later, on 28 February 2005, after weeks of demonstrations and joint Franco–American pressure in the UN Security Council, Syria announced that its troops would leave Lebanon.⁴⁸ Paula Dobriansky, Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs, arranged events as a kind of democratic bouquet:

there was a rose revolution in Georgia, an orange revolution in Ukraine, and most recently, a purple revolution in Iraq. In Lebanon, we see growing momentum for a "cedar revolution" that is unifying the citizens of that nation to the cause of true democracy and freedom from foreign influence.⁴⁹

The State Department's technicolor imagery pointed to something budding, but not yet in real bloom. To be sure, the resurgence of hope in the Middle East, abetted by a real European willingness to work with the United States, was promising. Had it not been for the American willingness to intervene forthrightly by dint of armed force in the Middle East, it was, just possibly and no matter how strange the public presentation of the case, that American power might be validated in the sands of Arabia. But imperial exertion requires more effort than the planners of either Vietnam or Iraq were willing or able to muster. In fact, such resources may well go beyond democratic state. Nothing of the requisite effort was expended in either Vietnam (taxes were not raised, reserves were not called), or in Iraq (taxes were lowered, and the Army was reduced to ten divisions), though the Iraq war public costs soon soared over a trillion dollars and perhaps vastly more. The bill was placed under the plate; payment would only be made much later.⁵⁰

“TRANSFORMATIONAL” FLOP

For the past decade or so, proponents of a so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) have promised a brave new world characterized by new sophistication in reconnaissance, robotics, surveillance, command, control, military organization, communications, computing power, stealth, and accuracy. All of America's competitive advantages would be brought to the battlefield, except large numbers of forces on the ground.⁵¹ After Operation Enduring Freedom had overthrown the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and destroyed al Qaeda's terrorist training camps using only air strikes and a total of 110 CIA officers and 316 Special Forces personnel on the ground,⁵² Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld interpreted the results as confirmation of the program of “transformation” he had so vigorously pursued.⁵³ President Bush concurred. The apparent victory over the Taliban augured a new level of possibilities. America can go on to “achieve big goals . . . [and] there is nothing bigger than to achieve world peace.”⁵⁴

The on-the-ground reality of the Revolution in Military Affairs was hardly elegant, pristine, or precise, as one oddly chipper Air Force news release implied: “Massive Ordnance Penetrator” – a thirty thousand pound conventional bomb designed to clear minefields, blast out helicopter landing zones in jungle areas” – the Air Force boasted was now going to be used in the “War on Terrorism” to attack caveensconced terrorists and as a “psychological weapon that can demoralize an enemy.”⁵⁵ By the end of 2004, Major General Charles H. Swannack Jr, the Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, explained that the use of massive firepower in urban areas might appear to be “using a sledgehammer to crush a walnut”, and “prosecute the war without holding one hand behind our back. When we identify . . . an enemy target, we're going to . . . take it out with every means we have available.”⁵⁶ But no matter how heavy or precise American firepower, it was inevitable that Americans would have to come to grips with the political costs of the ensuing havoc. As investigative reporter Sy Hersh put it with label-grabbing intensity:

Iraq is being turn into a “free-fire zone” . . . I have a friend . . . a Colonel, who had the awful task of being an urban bombing planner . . . three weeks ago Sunday after Fallujah I called him at home . . . and he picked up the phone and he said, “Welcome to Stalingrad.” We know what we're doing . . . They're not talking about it.⁵⁷

According to researchers at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, by January 2007 some 654,965 Iraqis had died since hostilities began in March 2003 as a result of the war. Some two million Iraqis had fled the country and perhaps a million or more had been displaced.⁵⁸ Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and Iran muscled each other for influence and power as Iraq started to crumble. An area, one wholly free from suicide bombs and armed fanatics, now bloomed with armed clans, sects, radicals, foreign agents, and madmen.

**“I DON’T DO DIPLOMACY” – DONALD RUMSFELD,
30 APRIL 2003⁵⁹**

The first four years of American policy in the era of G. W. Bush had many of the characteristics of the blockbuster movie of the 1980s – *Alien*. In that film, every time one peeked over the hand that sensibly covered the eyes, a predator beast seemed to take on a new and more horrible form. So much was misshapen, misspoken and wrong in the Bush years, that any real virtue of President Bush’s encounter with the world is seen by many intellectuals, even sizable numbers of former “neo con” *dévots*, if at all, only from behind a repelling wall of disgust.

But the search for the relevance of military power was hardly as insensate or silly as critics have suggested. As any reflection on the years leading up to 11 September 2001 might reveal, it is a lamentable truth that great states, hobbled by a fear of casualties, invite an array of miscreants and malefactors. Certainly it is better to meet one’s enemies with conviction and wherewithal than wait in the hope that events will turn out better or for a reformation of the human spirit.

As America’s second war with Iraq was about to commence, the *Los Angeles Times* reported a classified US State Department Report, indicating that a democratic domino theory was simply “not credible”.⁶⁰ There may be something to the domino theory. American power was weakened after the defeat in Vietnam and the Soviets were emboldened. American intervention in Iraq and the resulting modicum of success in propagating democracy may have had the same causal relationship between events as the rooster that claims he brings up the sun. But as Jordan’s King Abdullah told the *Washington Post*, in the face of swelling violence in occupied Iraq, the Bush administration had “initially frightened” people. “The thing is, this is open debate that wasn’t there three or four months ago . . . Once you open that door, it is very hard to shut it. So countries that are resistant to it are now having to look at the issues of reform.”⁶¹

Six months on, Adullah’s first take was apparently confirmed by events. Democracy had seemingly been kicked aside in the backwash of American tanks, planes, and fighting forces. It might have worked if force had been better integrated with some kind of realistic plan for the peace that followed victory. It might have worked had power been aggregated and legitimated by the inclusion of international institutions and leading *status quo* power centers. It might have worked had the “decent opinion of mankind” been recovered by a conscionable administration of justice in Iraq and in the so-called “War on Terror”, or if the United States had bothered to engage those disreputable regimes who had an interest in bandwagoning with Washington in the wake of 11 September at the high tide of American power, prestige and goodwill. It might have worked had force and diplomacy been integrated.

As the war against Afghanistan was about to begin, two senior US State Department officers met Iranian officials in Geneva.⁶² Iran promised to help with downed US pilots, offered advice on which targets to bomb in Afghanistan, and to help arm and manage those “players during the US-led coalition’s military operations” who were key to the US political and military victory in Operation Enduring Freedom.⁶³ In addition, Iran began turning over al Qaeda officials to Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan and kept at least one especially fanatically and sanguinary anti-American fundamentalist warlord from

making a disruptive reappearance at a time when the pro-American interim Afghan government of Hamid Karzai was being stood up.⁶⁴ One senior official recalled: “The Iranians said we don’t like al-Qaeda any better than you and we have assets in Afghanistan that could be useful.”⁶⁵

Secretary of State Powell was impressed. *En route* to Moscow he told the press, on 9 December 2001: “I am open to explore opportunities. We have been in discussions with the Iranians on a variety of levels . . .”⁶⁶ But in his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush announced that Iran was part of an “axis of evil”, thereby “scuttling any possibility of the Iranians offering tactical co-operation over Afghanistan”⁶⁷ on behalf of the interests they and the United States both stipulated were shared.⁶⁸

Still, some hope of a *rapprochement* with American power seemed to beat in the breasts of Iranian influentials. In the spring of 2003, a Swiss diplomatic channel yielded a “detailed two-page proposal” from Iran. The offer from Iran to the US to settle all differences was sent over by the Swiss Embassy to the State Department as an unclassified fax. The offer included comprehensive negotiations to resolve all bilateral differences between the US and Iran, including peace with Israel, cutting off material assistance to Palestinian armed groups, and pressuring them to halt terrorist attacks within Israel’s 1967 borders.⁶⁹

“The formal response” from the Bush administration, according to Flynt Leverett who served in senior posts at the National Security Council, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, “was to complain to the Swiss Foreign Ministry about the initiative of the Swiss Ambassador in Tehran”⁷⁰ and to administratively sanction the State Department officers who had entertained the overture seriously. As the Secretary of State limply explained later, he “couldn’t sell the idea of negotiating with a member of the ‘Axis of Evil’ to the White House”.⁷¹ Something called “Hadley’s Rules” emerged (Stephen J. Hadley was a long-time aide to Vice President Cheney). The United States would accept tactical information about terrorists from countries on the “state sponsors” list, but offer nothing in return.⁷²

In sum, the NSC, the Vice-President and the DoD defined policy, at least in the Bush administration’s first term, that excluded negotiations on the grounds that “to engage with these states was a concession to terrorism, a reward for bad behavior”.⁷³ By the middle of the second term a different twist emerged: negotiations would be permitted after all with those states that had actually obtained and tested weapons of mass destruction, including North Korea. The Vice-President, however, was still doing his best, it seemed, not just to undermine the treaty, but more especially to vex the Chinese who had helped so much in getting the accord with the DPRK that had been on the table four years and six bombs later.

In the week after the Six Party Accord with the DPRK was reached on 13 March 2006, Vice-President Cheney went to Japan, where he met with the families of the youngsters who had been kidnapped by the DPRK 20 years earlier. This issue of the 20 missing Japanese was the remaining inhibition holding Japan back from fulfilling its part of the Six-Party Agreement, in assisting with fuel aid. Then Mr Cheney went to Australia. A week before the UN Security Council was set to meet to decide on sanctions against Iran and again needing Chinese co-operation, Mr Cheney criticized the Chinese for spending too much on weapons modernization and for exploring space defense.⁷⁴

CONCLUSION

The President told Congress on 29 January 2002 that Americans face war without boundaries of time or geography:

Our war on terror is well begun, but it is only begun . . . Our enemies believed America was weak . . . They were as wrong as they are evil . . . We have a greater objective than eliminating threats and containing resentment . . . The last time I spoke here, I expressed the hope that life would return to normal. In some ways, it has. In others, it never will . . . We've come to know truths that we will never question: evil is real, and it must be opposed.⁷⁵

The process of “rooting out evildoers”, as Mr Bush defined America’s task, was declared with a grandiosity that seemed as worrisome as it was impractical. Missions as heroic and vast as the extirpation of evil require forces equal to the rhetoric, and more. As Clausewitz warned nearly two centuries earlier, setting out to overthrow an enemy, to annihilate him, is to “presuppose a great physical and moral superiority, or a great spirit of enterprise, an innate propensity to extreme hazards”.⁷⁶ The broad agenda of the Bush years yielded little in the way of policy guidance beyond the evident need for a more reasonable proportion between some policy ends and means. One of the solvents of the thick goo of misguided premises, overly large ambition and mismatched forces to missions, could have been the counsel of allies and the processes of the conference chamber. Into the Bush second term, however, these were self-denied. As a result, the United States appeared to have all but abandoned its place among nations as the great advocate of Law and Justice, along with its position as leader of one of the longest and most successful alliances in recorded history.

The root cause of much of American woes in the Bush years was the definition of the threat and the singular recourse to coercion as a means of mediating the American way in the world. When one side is denoted as “evil”, and the other pretends to be doing the work of both God and man at the same time, negotiations lose their meaning. During most of the Bush years negotiations were hardly tried. The reasons may have been distaste for the enterprise of compromise itself, those who engage in it professionally were regularly pilloried. For instance, former Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, labeled America’s Foreign Service and its professional diplomats, the “Foreign Disservice”.⁷⁷

More deeply, as a lesson of history from the time of Europe’s wars of religion, it seems a truth of history that states can negotiate interests, but not matters of good and evil. As the distinguished American historian, Richard Hofstadter, observed more than half a century ago, “given the magnitude of the threat, an evil conspiracy from abroad, with domestic collaborators, can be nothing other than ‘an all-out crusade’”.⁷⁸ Throughout American history there has been a tendency to exclude diplomacy abetted by a remarkable self-confidence in the virtue of the mission and unreasoned self-assurance that virtue and power will yield victory. The exclusion of diplomacy was all but absolute in the first term of President George W. Bush. According to Secretary of State Powell’s closest adviser in the run-up to the Iraq war, the State Department faced

a “cabal” of Rumsfeld and Cheney. Rumsfeld was overt in his hostility to the State Department’s enterprise. He instructed all those he could direct to “tell the State Department to go screw itself in a closet somewhere”.⁷⁹

An epithet for Bush years is premature, but it is now apparent that, as misbegotten and poorly premised as the policy was from 2002 on, it might have been redeemed by success had the administration heeded its professional diplomats and availed itself of the ancient practice of diplomacy to constrain its enemies and strengthen its alliances. Now, however, failure seems ineluctable. The nation is on track through a tunnel of horrors the likes of which the West has not seen since the decades of horrors that preceded the Westphalia peace.

NOTES

1. The expression is Dean Acheson’s and was used by former Secretary of State Colin Powell. See, Colin Powell, Kennan Lecture, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC, 25 March 2004, “Dean Acheson, captured this idea when he wrote that ‘influence is the shadow of power’. But there is no disagreement in principle about the relationship between power and persuasion in American diplomacy. Everyone who understands that power is necessary, but not always sufficient for foreign policy success knows, too, that force and authority are not the same. Not all use of force is created equal in diplomatic terms.” <http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2004/Mar/29-99170.html>.
2. Albert Eisele, “George Kennan Speaks Out About Iraq”, *The Hill*, 26 September 2002.
3. Michael Howard, Peter Paret (Eds), Karl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 577–627.
4. Henry Kissinger cited in William Safire, “Puppet as Prince”, *Harper’s*, Vol. 250, No. 1498, March 1975, p. 12.
5. Bob Woodward, *Part 3*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006, p. 408.
6. Bob Woodward, *State of Denial*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006. Also, Ron Suskind, *The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006.
7. Ann Scott Tyson, “US Gaining World’s Respect From Wars, Rumsfeld Asserts”, *Washington Post*, 11 March 2005, p. A04. Rumsfeld’s sentiments echoed George Herbert Walker Bush at the end of the first battle with Iraq; “I would think because of what happened we won’t have to use force around the world. I think when we say something is objectively correct . . . people are going to listen.” Press Conference, 1 March 1991, cited by Tariq Ali, *Bush in Babylon*, London: Verso, 2003, p. 137.
8. Clausewitz, *On War* (Frederic Natusch Maude and James John Graham, trans., Kegan Paul), Trench, Trübner & Co., 1908, Book 1, Chapter 1, #25, p. 24, http://gutenberg.com/eBooks/BlackMask_Online/onwarvon.htm.
9. See James Nathan, “Force, Statecraft, and American Foreign Policy”, *Polity*, Vol. 28, No. 2, Winter 1995, pp. 237–259.
10. “Perhaps,” Osgood cogitated, “. . . the people must be artfully cajoled into undertaking new courses of action by indirection . . . by disguising new imperatives . . .”. Robert Endicott Osgood, *Limited War, The Challenge to American Strategy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957, pp. 279–281.
11. Daniel Ellsberg, *Papers on the War*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972, pp. 292–293.
12. James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet*, New York: Viking, 2004.
13. As recalled by Dana Priest in a TV interview, “Rumsfeld’s War”, *Frontline*, a joint PPB–*Washington Post* investigation, posted 10 November 2004, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/>.
14. Michael Bechloss, “Tapes Show LBJ Knew Vietnam Would Win the War”, *Newsweek*,

- 12 November 2001, <http://www.newsweek.msnbc.com>. The Bush quote is on the CNN website: Sean Laughlin, “Bush Warns Militants”, 3 July 2003, <http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/07/02/sprj.nitop.bush/>.
15. Michael Beschloss, “I Don’t See Any Way of Winning”, *Newsweek*, 12 November 2001, <http://www.newsweek.msnbc.com>.
 16. President George W. Bush, UN Speech, 21 September 2004, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040921-3.html>.
 17. The Tonkin Resolution of August 1964 and Congress’s October 2002 stated that “the Communist regime in Vietnam . . . repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters . . . thereby created a serious threat to international peace.” *Congressional Record*, 6–7 August 1964, pp. 18132–18133, 18406–18407, 18458–18459 and 18470–18471, <http://vietnam.vassar.edu/doc9.html>. And the Congressional Resolution on Iraq in October 2002 fictively asserted: “Whereas Iraq . . . continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations.” For Iraq, see Office of the Press Secretary, 2 October 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/print/20021002-2.html>.
 18. The National Intelligence Estimate regarding Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction of 2002 was pasted together in three weeks, driving doubts and caveats to the footnotes. It was begun on 12 September and finished and printed on 1 October 2002 according to The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s Report on the US Intelligence Community’s Prewar Assessments on Iraq, Part 1 introduction, on 9 July 2004, <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/iraq.html>.
 19. *Congressional Record*, 4 October 2002, pp. S9933–S9975. Taken from the *Congressional Record Online* via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov](http://www.access.gpo.gov) [DOCID:cr04oc02-76].
 20. Jeffrey Record and W. Andrew Terrill, *Iraq and Vietnam: Differences and Similarities and Insights*, Army War College, SSI, May 2004, http://64.233.187.104/search?q=cache:_Vhpaoxnqe0J:www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdf/00367.pdf+Jeffrey+record+Vietnam+and+Iraq&hl=en&client=firefox-a.
 21. The international stake in a democratic Iraq seemed to be stronger than the case of Vietnam. See Mike Allen “NATO Partners Agree to Train Iraqi Troops”, *Washington Post*, 28 June 2004, p. A16.
 22. Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Book 1, Chapter 1 (Peter Paret and Michael Howard (eds)), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, and Richard N. Haas, “Wars of Choice”, *Washington Post*, 23 November 2003, p. B07.
 23. See Richard J. Barnet and Marcus Raskin, *After Twenty Years*, New York: Random House, 1965, p. 229n, and George Ball, “Slogans and Realities”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 47, July 1969, p. 624.
 24. Interview, conducted by the University of Chicago Press, 2005.
 25. “The President has the authority for the United States to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions and to promulgate higher standards and administrative regulations for violations of treaty obligations . . . of the Geneva Conventions Act sec. 6(a)(3)(A)”, United States Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 17 October 2006, enacting Chapter 47A of title 10 of signed 17 October 2006, in response to *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006) where the Supreme Court indicated the US had violated common article 4 of the Geneva Convention in its handling of prisoners.
 26. Jeffrey Toobin, “Killing Habeas Corpus: Arlen Specter’s About Face”, *The New Yorker*, 4 December 2006, http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/061204fa_fact.
 27. Henry Kissinger “Lessons of Vietnam”, circa. 12 May 1975, page 1 of 5 (draft – never submitted to the President), <http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/exhibits/vietnam/750512e.htm>.
 28. Richard Clarke, *Against All Enemies*, New York: Free Press, 2004, Chapter 1, pp. 30–31.

29. *Ibid.*
30. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, concluded though there were “some common themes in both sides’ hatred of the United States. But to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States . . .”. *The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks*, “The Foundation of the New Terrorism”, 20 September 2004, Chapter 2.5, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch2.htm.
31. “From Iraqi Document on Meeting with US Envoy”, *New York Times International*, 3 September 1990, p. 19, <http://www.chss.montclair.edu/english/furr/glaspie.html>.
32. Cited by Karen DeYoung, “Allies Are Cautious On ‘Bush Doctrine’”, *Washington Post*, 16 October 2001, p. A01.
33. This unhappy characterization was employed to characterize Germany and France by then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, on 22 January 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t01232003_t0122sdfpc.html. Glenn Kessler, “France Was Ready to Send Troops to Iraq, Book Says”, *Washington Post*, 6 October 2004, p. A18, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A9709-2004Oct5.html>.
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37. *Ibid.*
38. Remarks by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice at 28th Annual Convention of the National Association of Black Journalists, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/08/20030807-1.html>, Office of the Press Secretary, 7 August 2003.
39. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2935969.stm.
40. Paul Reynolds, “The ‘Democratic Domino’ Theory”, 10 April 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2935969.stm.
41. Greg Miller, “Democracy Domino Theory ‘Not Credible’; A State Department Report Disputes Bush’s Claim that Ousting Hussein Will Spur Reforms in the Mideast”.
42. “The War Behind Closed Doors”, (aired on PBS 20 February 2003). The companion Frontline website: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/themes/>. Inaugural test is at <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/20/politics/20BUSH-TEXT.html?ex=1109566800&en=7b61ffcddbdf0c3f&ei=5070>, published 20 January 2005.
43. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nssintro.html>.
44. Complete text at: <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/02/26/iraq/printable542180.shtml>.
45. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html>.
46. Samuel P Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
47. Neil McFarguar, “Mubarak Pushes Egypt to Allow Free Elections”, *New York Times*, 27 February 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/27/international/middleeast/27egypt.html>.
48. “Lebanese Ministers Forced to Quit”, *BBC*, 28 February 2005.
49. On-the-record briefing on the release of the 2004 Annual Report on Human Rights, 28 February 2005, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/spbr/42805.htm>.
50. C. Linda Bilmes and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “The Economic Costs Of The Iraq War: An Appraisal Three Years After The Beginning of the Conflict”, paper prepared for presentation at the ASSA meetings, Boston, January 2006, <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~lbilmes/paper/iraqnew.pdf>.

51. See, especially, the influential works by Col. John A. Warden III, USAF, "Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century", in Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E. Grinter (eds), *Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues*, Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1995. Also, Carl H. Builder, "Doctrinal Frontiers", *Airpower Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 4, Winter 1995, p. 12. In addition, there is now a website wholly devoted to the debate(s) surrounding the Revolution in Military Affairs. See <http://www.comw.org/rma/>. Much of the initial Rumsfeld-era assumptions regarding the utility of the new in the "War on Terror" has been effectively overturned by the Department of Defense's new manual. See David H. Petraeus, and James F. Amos, *US Army Counterinsurgency Handbook*, Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2007.
52. Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002, pp. 315–317.
53. Donald Rumsfeld, "Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks on '21st Century Transformation' of US Armed Forces", remarks delivered by the Secretary of at the National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington DC, 31 January 2002. Available online at http://www.defenselink.mil/_speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html (13 June 2006).
54. Woodward, *op. cit.*, p. 282.
55. See Local6.com (WKMG, TV. Elgin Fl), "Eglin Studying Massive 30,000-Pound Bomb: Bomb Would Be 40 Percent Bigger Than MOAB", posted 8 November 2004.
56. Joel Brinkley, "Few Signs of Infiltration by Foreign Fighters in Iraq", *New York Times*, Section A, p. 10, Column 1, 19 November 2003, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA0610FB3D5F0C7A8DDDA80994DB404482> and Dr Thomas R. Searle, "Making Airpower Effective against Guerrillas", 1 September 2004, *Air & Space Power Journal*, Fall 2004, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj04/fal04/vorfal04.html>.
57. Seymour Hersh, "We've Been Taken Over by a Cult", interview with Amy Goodman, 6 January 2005, <http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=05/01/26/1450204>.
58. The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) reported this month that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq has forced one out of every eight Iraqis to flee their homes – more than 3.7 million people, <http://www.un.org/ha/moreha.htm>, 23 January 2007. These figures have been challenged. See Neil Munro and Carl M. Cannon, "Data Bomb", *National Journal*, 4 January 2008, <http://news.nationaljournal.com/articles/databomb/index.htm>. A biting and well-sourced reply to Munro and Cannon was issued by Dr John Tirman, the Executive Director and a principal research scientist at MIT's Center for International Studies. See Tirman, "Bombs Away: The Anatomy of a Hatchet Job", <http://www.johntirman.com/Bombs%20Away%20-%20a%20dull%20hatchet%20job.pdf>.
59. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, 30 April 2003.
60. Greg Miller, "Democracy Domino Theory 'Not Credible'", *op. cit.* "A State Department report disputes Bush's claim that ousting Hussein will spur reforms in the Mideast, intelligence officials say", *Los Angeles Times*, 14 March 2003.
61. Glenn Kessler, "Jordan King Hopeful on Democracy Plan", *Washington Post*, 17 June 2004, p. A22.
62. Flynt Leverett, *Dealing with Teheran*, New York: Century Foundation, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
64. Glenn Kessler, "US Eyes Pressing Uprising In Iran", *Washington Post*, 2003; Tony Karon and Azadeh Moeaveni, "Iran, Afghanistan Juggle Hot Potato Hekmatyar", *Time Magazine*, February 2002, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,212595,00.html>.
65. Flynt L. Leverett, quoted by Garreth Porter, "The American Prospect, Online, Iran, Syria, Libya, and Sudan all approached the United States through various channels to offer their help in the fight against al-Qaeda", in Gareth Porter, "Burnt Offering: The American Prospect", 21 May 2006, <http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=11539>.
66. <http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/dec/6759.htm>. In part, Powell was referring to the Bush administration's first special envoy for Afghanistan who worked with Iran on standing up a new government. The Iranians spotted an omission in a UN draft

- of “democracy” and “the war on terrorism” and suggested that the “Afghan government be required to commit to both.” The envoy was James Dobbins, See his “Time to Deal With Iran”, *The Washington Post*, 6 May 2004, <http://www.rand.org/commentary/050604WP.html>.
67. Flynt L. Leverett, “Iran: The Gulf Between Us, Op Ed”, *The New York Times*, 24 January 2006, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/fleverett/20060124.htm>.
 68. In no time, Gulbudin Hekmatyar, long time Afghan brigand and a life-long enemy of the United States, left Iran to continue his pattern of fundamentalist mayhem. Still, some co-operation continued (a year later, the Swiss, who represented American interest in Iran, continued to relay messages between Washington and Iran via the Swiss embassy in Washington at a time “when the Islamic republic was not yet spinning centrifuges and enriching uranium”). Flynt Leverett, *Illusion and Reality*, *The American Prospect*, 12 September 2006, <http://www.prospect.org/web/page.wv?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=11859>.
 69. The document was obtained and authenticated by Trita Parsi, an Iranian scholar at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, see Gareth Porter, “Iran Proposal to US Offered Peace with Israel”, *Inter Press Service*, 24 May 2006, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/intervention/iran/general/2006/0524irancontradiction.htm>.
 70. Bernard Gwertzman, “Leverett: Bush Administration ‘Not Serious’ About Dealing With Iran”, 31 March 2006, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10326/>.
 71. Carol Giacomo, “Ex-aide Says Rice Mised US Congress on Iran”, Leverett was speaking at a Capitol Hill Conference, 15 February 2006, http://www.swissinfo.org/eng/international/ticker/detail/Ex_aide_says_Rice_mised_U_S_Congress_on_Iran.html?siteSect=143&sid=7530473&cKey=1171499011000.
 72. Syria also co-operated with Washington immediately after 9/11 by jailing known al Qaeda members, forwarding transcripts of interrogations, and sharing other information with the CIA and allowed the FBI to question individuals who knew 11 September in Syria. The result was said to have led to the disruption of terrorist attacks against US military forces in the Gulf. Steven Erlanger, “Germans Say Figure Linked to September 11 is in Syria Jail”, *The New York Times*, 19 June 2002; Peter Finn, “Syria Interrogating al Qaeda Recruiter”, *The Washington Post*, 19 June 2002; Douglas Frantz, “Sharing Information: Learning to Spy with Allies”, *The Washington Post*, 8 September 2002; Howard Schneider, “Syria Evolves as Anti-Terror Ally”, *The Washington Post*, 25 July 2002.
 73. This was called “Hadley’s rules”: Stephan Hadley was Vice-President Cheney’s former assistant who served on the NSC and worked with the Defense Department’s Donald Rumsfeld’s staff to steel the State Department’s fluffly reflexes in the face of new necessities of the war on terror. See John Richardson, “The Secret History of the Impending War with Iran That the White House Doesn’t Want You to Know”, *Esquire*, 18 October 2007, <http://www.esquire.com/features/iranbriefing1107>.
 74. Peter Alford, “Japan Upset at N. Korea Status” *The Australian*, 23 February 2007, <http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/wireless/story/0,8262,4-21272493,00.html>; Reuters, “Cheney Concerned about China and North Korea”, *International Herald Tribune*, 23 February 2007, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/23/news/cheney.php>.
 75. George W. Bush, *State of the Union Address*, 29 January 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.
 76. *Book Eight*, Chapter 5, p. 601. Also see on this, Rick Atkinson, “How Wars are Won”, *Washington Post*, 16 September 2001, p. B07.
 77. Newt Gingrich, “Rogue State Department”, *Foreign Policy*, No. 137, July/August 2003, www.foreignpolicy.com.
 78. *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and other Essays*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, 1965, reissue 1996, p. 31.
 79. David Von Drehle, “Wrestling With History: Sometimes you have to fight the war you have, not the war you wish you had”, *Washington Post*, 13 November 2005, p. W12, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/08/AR2005110801072.html>.