Was There a Clinton Doctrine? President Clinton's Foreign Policy Reconsidered

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Was There a Clinton Doctrine?
President Clinton’s Foreign Policy Reconsidered

JOHN DUMBRELL

This article discusses the concept of ‘doctrine’ within American foreign policy and seeks to locate a possible Clinton Doctrine. It argues, against some interpretations of the Clinton presidency, that Clinton’s foreign policy did have a degree of coherence necessary to sustain a ‘doctrine’. The broad development of Clinton’s foreign policy between 1993 and 2001 is summarized and assessed. Five possible Clinton doctrines are investigated. The article concludes that the best case for being regarded as the Clinton Doctrine relates to the doctrine of ‘rogue states’.

Was there a Clinton Doctrine? The question was raised frequently while Bill Clinton was in the White House. Some initial ground-clearing is essential here, and will be undertaken in the first section of this article. However, let us at the beginning note at least six possible responses to the question.

The first response is that, in the absence of any purposeful coherence whatsoever, the Clinton foreign policy lacked a unifying doctrine. In this vein, W.G. Hyland writes: ‘In the absence of an overall perspective, most issues were bound to degenerate into tactical manipulations, some successful some not. Clinton stumbled from crisis to crisis, trying to figure out what was popular, what would be effective, and what choices would pose the lowest risks to his presidency, and, especially to his reputation.”

For Henry Kissinger, Clinton’s foreign policy was ‘a series of seemingly unrelated decisions in response to specific crises’. A second response would be to locate the Clinton Doctrine in post-Cold War American democracy promotion, especially in the notion of ‘democratic enlargement’ (interpreted by commentators like Douglas Brinkley and Graham Allison as US-sponsored global market extension). For Brinkley, ‘enlargement was about spreading democracy through promoting the gospel of geoconomics’.

A third candidate is ‘assertive humanitarianism’, or, as journalist Paul Starobin called it, ‘liberal hawkism’: a doctrine of military intervention for humanitarian ends.

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fourth perspective might involve interpreting the Clinton Doctrine as one of restraint: especially a reluctance to intervene in foreign disputes, allied to a fear of racing ahead of the domestic mood. Fifthly, the authentic Clinton Doctrine might conceivably be identified as a unilateralist American hegemonism: a foreign policy, for its opponents in the European left, of ‘mindless muscle’. Lastly, there is the ‘doctrine’ of ‘rogue’ or ‘backlash’ states, parlayed in Clinton’s final year as President into states or nations ‘of concern’.

**Foreign Policy Doctrines**

The literature on the history of American foreign relations is rather unclear about what exactly constitutes a presidential ‘doctrine’. C.V. Crabb lists the following: the Monroe Doctrine on Western hemispheric ambitions of European powers (1823); the Truman Doctrine (aid to Greece and Turkey and containment in Europe, 1947); the Eisenhower Doctrine (a warning to the USSR in relation to the Middle East, 1957); two Johnson Doctrines (warnings issued in relation to the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution and the 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic); the Nixon Doctrine of 1969 (an undertaking that the US would help the international anti-communist cause, though not necessarily directly); and the Carter Doctrine (the 1980 declaration of American intent regarding Soviet ambitions in the Persian Gulf region). We may add the 1985 Reagan Doctrine (a slightly ambiguous commitment to anti-communist forces in the developing world). Crabb adds some ‘sub-’ or ‘non-presidential’ doctrines, notably the Open Door and the 1932 Stimson Doctrine on the non-recognition of Japanese aggression. (Again, we may add the post-Vietnam War Weinberger and Powell doctrines on the feasibility of and conditions for US military intervention).

It is very unclear what exactly constitutes a ‘doctrine’, beyond the fact that certain of these doctrines are widely and unexceptionably attributed to presidents by historians and various other commentators. Even so, Crabb’s list, especially regarding the little discussed Johnson ‘Doctrines’, is by no means beyond dispute. Emily Goldman and Larry Berman, in defiance of Monroe, assert: ‘Foreign policy doctrines were never coined prior to the Cold War’. They see the most ‘common definition of a doctrine’ as ‘a set of prescriptions that specify how tools should be employed in the service of strategy and that serve as a guide to decision making’.

While some commentators clearly do see ‘doctrine’ as coterminous with ‘grand strategy’, Goldman and Berman are correct in pointing out
that many commonly accepted presidential doctrines do not fit this requirement. What most presidential doctrines seem to amount to, in fact, are unilateral warnings to enemies, often designed primarily to mobilize opinion at home. Some, like the Truman Doctrine, have involved a codification of ‘grand strategy’. Most have been exemplifications or applications of (usually anti-communist containment) ‘grand strategy’. Some of the ambiguity and uncertainty here may be appreciated if we remember both that President Bush’s New World Order is almost never described as the Bush Doctrine; while the early Clinton administration certainly did use the term ‘doctrine’ in connection with the post-Cold War quest to find a ‘vision’ to replace containment.9

Coherence

Contrary to the arguments presented above, let us for a moment pursue the view that ‘doctrine’ amounts to ‘vision’ or ‘grand strategy’. It clearly is the case that the Clinton administration did not bequeath to its successor an unambiguous grand strategy. Academic debate in the post-Cold War world has yielded any number of alternative grand strategies, usually involving some combination of cooperative multilateralism, unilateralism, restraint, democracy promotion, global primacy, and neo-isolationism. Discussing the strategies of multilateralism, regionalism, and unilateralism in 1997, Benjamin Cohen further muddied the waters by arguing that all three ‘may in practice be made to function as complementary components of an effective global policy – three cards in a potentially winning hand’.10

At least when viewed in connection with a putative Clinton Doctrine, the point about ‘grand strategy’ is really that it is too grand. The confusion and strategic uncertainty of the post-Cold War order have not been conducive to presidential grand theorizing. Foreign policy generally is made in the heat of events and grand strategies (as distinct from explicit warnings to enemies) usually emerge in implicit rather than explicit declaratory form. Perhaps Clinton should be criticized for failing to achieve a new ‘Truman Doctrine’: a statement of general principle, embodied in an explicit warning. However, Clinton’s circumspection may be defended as sage and pragmatic. It is not so long ago, after all, that the Truman Doctrine was widely condemned as insensitive and peremptory. Stephen Walt’s argument about the ‘paradox of unipolarity’ should also be taken seriously, despite the ominous rumblings of international terrorism. During the Clinton era, American
international power was huge. However, although ‘any number of problems merit US attention, America simply does not face the sort of imminent geopolitical challenge it often faced in the past’.11 The post-Cold War lowering of the international stakes (aligned, at least to some degree, with the prospects of diminishing national returns in an era of globalization) worked against any clear articulation of a new ‘grand strategy’. A complete failure to think in innovative grand strategic terms is not defensible. The Clinton administration was not immune to what James Kurth has called ‘the victory disease’: the assumption that old strategies could be adapted to the new circumstance created by US victory in the Cold War. Nevertheless, ‘democratic enlargement’ – the concept which will come to be seen as Clinton’s main contribution to the ‘grand strategy’ debate – did constitute an integrating ‘vision’ (albeit a highly controversial one) for our times.12

Continuing this partial defence of conceptual coherence in the Clinton administration, it should be remembered that Clinton did attempt on several occasions to spell out a foreign policy vision. These attempts generally centred on ‘engagement and enlargement’, often combined with efforts to plant internationalism in the soil of various invoked threats to US security. For example, in his major foreign policy address given in San Francisco (February 1999), Clinton identified the pursuit of human rights, democracy, and ‘freedom’ as one major plank of US internationalism. Other aims were the achievement of international peace; the peaceful integration into the world system of China and Russia; the protection of the US from ‘borderless threats’; and the building of a global trading and financial system. During this speech, Clinton twice used the phrase ‘inexorable logic of globalization’.13

The vagueness of goals and the administration’s sensitivity to domestic pressures sometimes pushed Clinton’s foreign policy perilously close to incoherence. The extraordinary variety of positions from which the policy was criticized also testifies to its protean character. Clinton, for example, was criticized as an appeaser (of China and North Korea) and as the ‘bully of the free world’. His administration was excoriated for pursuing ‘foreign policy as social work’ and as embodying ‘the end of idealism’.14 At the operational level, there were some notorious snafus (for example, in connection with policy towards Bosnia in 1993–95 and in relation to China and the World Trade Organization in 1999). At the extreme, Clinton was accused of almost unprecedented deference to domestic pressure, including accusations connecting the Lewinsky affair to the 1998–99 air strikes on Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
The trajectory of Clinton’s foreign policy can only properly be understood in terms of the changing political and international conditions attending the first and second administrations. Before charting this ‘developmental map’, however, one or two obvious points must be made. In post-Cold War conditions, absent the integrating Soviet threat, domestic opinions and domestic lobbies did have to be treated with care and attention. Any other course risked provoking a major isolationist reaction. At the operational level, Clinton’s record compared reasonably favourably with most administrations. The key personnel (Secretaries of State Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright, National Security Advisers Tony Lake and Sandy Berger, Defense Secretaries Les Aspin, William Perry, and William Cohen, key figures like Assistant Secretary of State, later UN Ambassador, Richard Holbrooke) had disagreements over issues from Bosnia to Northern Ireland. Holbrooke’s Bosnian memoir, To End a War, showed considerable impatience with the Pentagon and its post-Vietnam War irresolution. Yet we were spared the virtual open warfare between White House and State Department, observable in both the Carter and early Reagan presidencies.

Tony Lake, who had previously worked both for Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance, consciously toiled to avoid repeating the bureaucratic conflicts of the Nixon and Carter presidencies. It is also worth noting that the Clinton administration’s foreign policy process may have suffered by being compared to its predecessor; the Bush (senior) team generally worked with an exceptional degree of efficiency, which was rather difficult to equal. As for the ‘wag the dog’ accusations, perhaps all that can be stated is that they were very extreme, very serious, and entirely unprovable. The fact that they were made at all – and made by people as various as Christopher Hitchens and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (in the context of the 1999 Iraqi bombing, though not in the case of Sudan and Afghanistan) – again emphasizes the complex, and often very extreme, range of reactions to Clinton’s foreign policy.

Now to our developmental map of Clinton’s foreign policy. The first Clinton administration embodied four integrating themes: ‘economism’; multilateral ‘enlargement’ and democracy promotion; ‘selective engagement’; and military restructuring. ‘Economism’ included the free trade agenda (NAFTA ratification and the 1994 GATT agreement, along with numerous bilateral trade pacts); the (sometimes almost neo-mercantilist) promotion of American trade; a concern for the ‘big emerging markets’; and ‘dollar’ or ‘Big Mac’ diplomacy. It also involved the deliberate highlighting of economic foreign policy as a key element in
post-Cold War national security. Multilateralist ‘enlargement’ and democracy promotion affected countries as various as Russia, Mozambique, Malawi and Northern Ireland. (American policymakers tended to equate devolved power with ‘democracy’, even in established parliamentary systems.) Never a ‘starry-eyed crusade’, democracy promotion exhibited its pragmatic aspect in respect of policy towards China, Nigeria, and the Pacific region. Early invocations of ‘assertive multilateralism’ were soon finessed. ‘Selective engagement’ involved the establishment, in the heat of early involvement in Somalia, of criteria governing future interventions. These criteria seemed to involve a prioritization of domestic overspill (whether involving drugs, immigration, or influential domestic lobbies) as a condition for US activism in particular international crises; regional or hemispheric concerns; the search for markets and other key economic interests (notably continued access to Middle Eastern oil). Military restructuring incorporated Les Aspin’s ‘bottom-up review’ and projections that, by 1998, Pentagon spending as a percentage of GDP would be less than half what it was in 1970.

Towards the end of the first term, and stretching into the second, three major developments conspired to transform the trajectory of this early Clinton foreign policy. The first involved the unsustainability of the ‘selective engagement’ criteria in the Balkans. By mid-1995, a combination of factors (among them, congressional pressure, the failure of the European Union, and the view that instability in southeastern Europe could affect US interests) had pushed the administration towards activism in Bosnia. Also in 1995, the Republicans assumed control of Congress. They brought a policy of nationalism – ‘Americanism’ to GOP supporters – unilateralism, hostility to the United Nations, and occasionally downright isolationism. The Clinton administration considered various ways of reacting to this rival foreign policy, but could not avoid making compromises towards it. Lastly, by 1995 it had become clear that American international decline, a staple of foreign policy commentary since the era of the Vietnam War, was a thing of the past. Unipolarity, erosion and eventual elimination of the Reagan deficit, the US-led information revolution, unequalled US defence capability and the ‘Clinton boom’ all affected Washington’s perception of the opportunities and policies available to the US.

The themes of the second Clinton administration were to some large extent the products of Bosnian experience, the need to countenance the views of the Republican Congress and the clear recognition of American
hegemony (albeit a hegemony still operating in an environment of considerable strategic uncertainty). ‘Democratic enlargement’ continued as a key integrating principle, now with an even firmer identification between ‘democracy’ and ‘markets’. (During the entire Clinton presidency, US exports as a percentage of American GDP grew from 9.9 to 12.1). The US became an even more prominent standard-bearer for economic globalization, despite serious setbacks (notably, the 1997 denial of ‘fast track’ trade agreement negotiating authority in Congress and the 1999 ‘battle of Seattle’). Another key second term theme was a move towards unilateralist positions on issues such as the International Criminal Court, a more distinct ambivalence to the United Nations, the raids on Sudan and Afghanistan, and the 1999 bombing of Kosovo without UN Security Council sanction. Some of the unilateralist thrust, notably the 1996 Helms–Burton legislation on Cuba, clearly reflected the legislature’s priorities. It also, however, reflected a new confidence in American power on the part of the White House. A third theme was remilitarization, traceable both to the congressional pressure (as in the case of National Missile Defence) but also to presidential acceptance that notions of the ‘hollow military’ and the imbalance between commitments and resources should be taken seriously. Lastly, there was the concept of ‘assertive humanitarianism’, evidenced most clearly in the Kosovo conflict. This was linked to unilateralism, but also represented the development of first term democracy promotion and Wilsonianism in an era of confidence.

This developmental map is sketchy and over-simplified. It does, however, provide a reasonable response to those critics (like Hyland and Kissinger) who ascribed no coherence whatsoever to the Clinton foreign policy.

The Clinton Doctrine: Five Candidates

Moving now beyond this foundational debate about coherence and direction, five candidates present themselves as possible Clinton Doctrines.

‘Democratic Enlargement’

This was the key driving and integrating force behind the Clinton foreign policy and probably does deserve, as Brinkley argues, the title of the Clinton Doctrine. Originally conceived by Jeremy Rosner and Tony Lake as an entry in the post-Cold War ‘Kennan sweepstakes’, ‘enlargement’ was the big idea of the early Clinton years. It tied the administration into
global marketization and the concept of the Kantian democratic peace (under which democracies choose not to fight one another). American security and prosperity were thus to provide the basis for a new activist internationalism. As noted above, the promotion of ‘market democratization’ extended into the second term, despite the dropping of the actual term ‘enlargement’. (Democratic ‘enlargement’ was not a rhetorical success and also arguably became confused in the public consciousness with enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.)

A few comments about the US promotion of ‘market democracy’ are in order. The administration was reasonably, though not entirely, consistent in this area. White House support for an unprecedented number of trade sanctions (in line with the ‘rogue nations’ policy, discussed below) represented one inconsistency. Clinton, of all people, was aware of the domestic impact of globalization and of the possible provocation of an anti-American, anti-globalization international backlash. Clinton reacted to the ‘battle of Seattle’ (between police and anti-globalization protestors at the 1999 World Trade Organization meeting) by calling for strengthened labour standards. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright warned in 1998 of ‘a widespread backlash, tinged with anti-Americanism, against free markets’. The conflation of ‘markets’ and ‘democracy’ also called into severe question the integrity of America’s narrower democracy promotion agenda. When Clinton declared in his second inaugural address (1997) that, for the first time in history, more people on earth were living under democracy than under dictatorship, he was recruiting to democracy’s banner some rather problematic regimes. The global democratizing tide was no longer in full flood. A common developing world phenomenon is the ‘low intensity democracy’, geared to market penetration and outward democratic forms rather than to sustained and comprehensive democratic development.

If we equate presidential doctrine with ‘vision’, then here is the Clinton Doctrine. In a sense, of course, ‘democratic enlargement’ was nothing new – merely a continuation of capitalist power projection in a world transformed by the collapse of Soviet communism. However, a re-articulation of underlying objectives can (as our earlier discussion indicated) qualify as ‘doctrine’. What tends to disqualify ‘democratic enlargement’ is not its unoriginality, but rather its all-encompassing foundationalism. As argued above, presidential doctrines tend to embody specific warnings to specific enemies, rather than assertions of general purpose. Let us continue the search.
In June 1999, Clinton delivered a speech to NATO forces in Macedonia in tones which seemed to point towards an emerging Clinton Doctrine: ‘Whether you live in Africa or Central Europe or any other place, if somebody comes after civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background, or their religion, and it is within our power to stop it, we will stop it. We should not countenance genocide or ethnic cleansing anywhere in the world.’ Stung by criticisms that America had ignored the slaughter in Rwanda in 1994–95 and buoyed up by second term confidence in American power, Clinton seemed to be outlining a near-indiscriminate doctrine of intervention for humanitarian ends. The emergence of ‘liberal hawkism’ as a set of beliefs held by US foreign policy elites was linked to various end-of-century developments in international law and liberal thought. It was connected to legal questionings of notions of ‘absolute’ sovereignty, to journalistic defences (led by David Rieff) of assertive humanitarianism in the post-Cold War order, and to an emerging liberal consensus about the need to fight for the cause of multicultural pluralism. With one eye on domestic social divisions in the US, American liberals (in the words of Benjamin Schwarz) sought to ‘encourage other countries to prove to us that more pluralism, and more tolerance are all that are needed to reunite divided societies’.

In this connection, post-Vietnam War use-of-force doctrines were modified, towards a doctrine of ‘Powell-plus’, limited interventions for limited goals.

The rise of ‘assertive humanitarianism’ in Clinton’s second term should not be overstated. Doctrines of pragmatic restraint were not abandoned. Sniffing the spoor of a newly minted, expansive presidential doctrine, as Clinton addressed the troops in 1999, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger swiftly switched into reverse: ‘I don’t think anybody ever articulated a doctrine which said that we ought to intervene whenever there’s a humanitarian problem. That’s not a doctrine, that’s just a kind of prescription for America to be all over the world and ineffective.’

Far from consistently following a line of militarized assertive humanitarianism, the Clinton administration was generally indecisive about the use of force. Its legacy in this area was exceptionally ambiguous. Early attempts to codify guidelines – essentially trying to
adapt the Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force to a world of complex, limited ethnic and regional conflicts, and embodied in Presidential Direction 25 – partially unravelled in the Balkans. Yet, not least in Kosovo, intense anxiety about committing ground troops in hostile environments continued to affect policy. Clinton did not deliver a statement on international restraint in terms declaratory enough to constitute a ‘doctrine’. However, it is worthwhile considering whether ‘restraint’ may be held to amount to a ‘doctrine’, in the sense of an integrating foreign policy ‘vision’.

The post-Cold War foreign policy debate saw the clear articulation of restraintist positions, from the anti-imperialism of the left to the ‘minimal state’ isolationism of the libertarian right. In post-Cold War conditions, the case for restraint was most commonly made by realist defenders of ‘the national interest’. Various positions on defence retrenchment, possibly to around two per cent of GDP, were advocated. In such analyses, US security was held to centre on the retention of a strong second-strike nuclear capacity; on regional power alliances, designed to inhibit aggressors and nuclear proliferation, on an enhanced US intelligence capability, geared to detecting new dangers; and on the development of new, unilateral defence systems, including National Missile Defence. Advocates of restraint tended to decry the case for international democracy promotion, which was seen as likely to entrap America in interminable regional conflicts. Richard Haass’s doctrine of ‘regulation’ was focused on ‘the external conduct of states’. Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky advocated military withdrawal from Europe and Asia, with a more limited pullback from the oil-rich Middle East. Resources should be directed inwards: ‘Now that the Cold War is over, George McGovern is right.’

Set against these various programmes for international restraint, Clinton’s record cannot be judged as embodying any central restraintist doctrine. By the end of 1995, Clinton had already ordered US forces into 25 separate operations (compared to 17 in Reagan’s two terms, and 14 under Bush). US defence postures and commitments at the start of the twenty-first century did not reflect the dictates of restraint. Clinton’s January 1999 State of the Union address included a request for an extra $12 billion in military outlays. US military commitments actually increased following the Cold War’s end. Under Clinton, US military spending decreased (from $331.3 billion to $289 billion annually), though the US was, by 1999, spending more on defence than the combined total of its nine closest competitors. Clinton was mindful of public support for
a strategy of restraint, rooted in ‘national interests’. He clearly did not accept ‘restraint’ as an integrating foreign policy and defence doctrine.

‘Unilateralism’

Bill Clinton is generally regarded, like George H.W. Bush, as a multilateralist. The comparatively clear-cut unilateralism, or ‘American internationalism’, of the first phase of George W. Bush’s presidency did, however, rather serve to exaggerate the extent of his predecessor’s multilateralist commitments.

The case for unilateralism is a clear and venerable one. It rests on arguments of national interest and national sovereignty, of ‘not permitting others to define what is and what is not in our interests’. In the post-Cold War order, unilateralism soon became tied up with the nationalist, ‘America First’ mood of a large section of the Republican party and with the ‘new populism’ evident in sections of public opinion. In the unilateralist analysis, the Cold War strategy of ‘preponderant power’ had run its course. The US, especially in military terms, was so unlike other countries that it had no reason to treat them as equals. US interests in the new order, according to this analysis, were actually quite narrow. Allies were likely to be unreliable and inclined either to free-ride on the back of American power, or to inhibit the rational pursuit of American interests.

Against all this, the Clinton administration was generally concerned to defend the multilateralist inheritance from the George H.W. Bush years. Yet multilateralism was defended pragmatically and in far from absolute terms. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in 1993 described multilateralism as ‘one of the many foreign policy tools at our disposal’. The first Clinton administration was prepared to impose unilateral trade sanctions on Japan in market access disputes. The second term, as we have seen, involved a significant move towards unilateralist positions (despite Clinton’s endorsement of the International Criminal Court shortly before he departed from office). In the areas where the US embraced unilateralist positions, it was difficult to disentangle congressional pressure from the view, shared by the Clinton team as well as by legislative Republicans, that the US was, ultimately, sufficiently powerful to ignore multilateralist constraints. Future historians may come to see the Clinton years as constituting a bridge towards the kind of unilateralism pursued by the early George W. Bush administration, rather than as a clear rejection of it. On balance, however, Clinton was a resister of legislative unilateralism, not a unilateralist manqué. It would be perverse to install post-Cold War unilateralism as the Clinton Doctrine.
'Rogue States'

If we are seeking a declaratory ‘warning to enemies’ as the basis of the Clinton Doctrine, then we have now reached our goal. The policy of ‘rogue states’ can be traced back at least as far as the Carter administration, when the State Department in 1979 inaugurated its ‘terrorist list’ of what President Reagan came to call ‘outlaw governments’. It was taken up by the Clinton administration in the context of its developing ‘dual containment’ policy for Iran and Iraq. Rooted in judgements on the external behaviour of states, the policy seemed at odds with ‘democratic enlargement’ and revived Wilsonianism. National Security Adviser Tony Lake attempted to square the circle in 1994 by invoking the concept of a ‘family’ of nations – presumably a marketized, democratizing family, headed by the US – threatened by ‘recalcitrant and outlaw states’.

In fact, the ‘rogue’ concept itself had no basis in international law. It constituted, rather, a realist component of the early ‘selective engagement’ policy: a means of mobilizing domestic and international opinion, and ultimately of justifying unilateral American action, against regimes deemed to embody some kind of sustained threat to US interests. The policy became entwined with worries about nuclear proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction and long-range missile attacks. It was in this latter context that Clinton used the phrase, ‘rogue nations’ in his 1999 State of the Union address.

By 1999, major problems with the ‘rogue states’ doctrine had become apparent. The condemnation of Iran as a ‘rogue’ left the administration in a position of unnecessary inflexibility when it was called upon to respond to the 1997 election of (the relatively moderate) Mohammed Khatami. The grouping together of Stalinist holdovers and various Arabist regimes made little sense. ‘Rogue states’ doctrine did little to enhance the development of a clearly directed response to international terrorism. The development of North Korea’s nuclear programme provoked the Clinton administration into effective abandonment of the ‘rogue states’ approach towards Pyongyang. Aside from its inherent inflexibility, the policy also faced the problem of ‘rogue’ behaviour by ‘non-rogue’ states. As Robert Litwak points out, the policy did not give the US any guide as to how to respond to the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. The US remained committed to engagement with Syria, a major player in the Middle Eastern peace process, but also a developer of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The ‘rogue states’ approach, especially in regard to sanctions, additionally
drew the US into conflict with European, Asian and even (in the case of Canada) North American allies.29

The ‘rogue states’ policy, certainly as it was formulated by Tony Lake in 1993–94, was not a success. However, failure is not disqualification for the title of the Clinton Doctrine. Its lack of status in international law, its declaratory and unilateral nature, its rooting in a realist calculus of US interests, its articulation in terms of a ‘warning to enemies’: all these features, particularly when we consider previous examples of presidential doctrine, actually strengthen its claim to be considered as the Clinton Doctrine.

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NOTES


3. The Economist, 19 Feb. 2000 (‘It’s the World, Stupid’).


